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1. Background and current challenges facing the power 
sector 
This paper discusses some of the new and continuing ways in which the public 
sector is involved in the electricity / energy sector around the world. This 
involvement continues to be significant in spite of the long-running trend 
towards privatisation, competition and independent regulation in the energy 
sector (see Pollitt, 2008a, on the global trends). Indeed all of our examples are 
drawn from countries – the UK (Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Denmark, 
New Zealand, Finland and Chile - in which the trend towards liberalisation has 
been apparent and where the liberalised market and regulatory arrangements 
are often thought to be examples of good practice worthy of being studied and 
adopted in other countries. 
 
The public involvement we discuss is occurring in different stages of the energy 
system, in projects with very different risk and technology characteristics. Thus 
we discuss examples of investments in electricity generation (nuclear and 
renewable), transmission and distribution (of both electricity and gas) and in 
LNG import facilities (where the power sector is an anchor customer). 
 
It is important to say at the outset what we mean by public ownership. 
Traditionally public ownership tended to take one of two forms in energy: a large 
state owned company (SOE) (e.g. the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) in Great Britain) or an often much smaller local municipally owned utility 
(e.g. a town level electricity distribution utility). Both of these types of entities 
tended to be 100% owned by the central government or the local authority. In 
some countries other hybrid ownership forms developed that could not be 
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characterised as either government ownership or private ownership (in the 
conventional tradable shareholder-owned firm sense).2 These included rural 
electric cooperatives in the US or customer owned utilities in Denmark. 
Nowadays, as we shall demonstrate, public involvement in ownership (in the 
sense of residual control rights, following Hart and Moore, 1990) takes many 
different forms. Many SOEs and municipal companies have been part privatised 
and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for specific investments (including several of 
our case studies) can have multiple public sector and private sector 
shareholders. Special types of companies, such as community interest companies 
(see section 4.1), consumer trusts (see section 4.4) and companies limited by 
guarantee (see section 4.5), have important characteristics of publicly owned 
companies. These include public appointment of directors and restrictions on the 
tradability of ownership rights which make them operate very like many more 
typical government owned companies. The main difference is that equity risk is 
transferred to consumers. The benefits include safeguarding the interests of 
consumers but within a lighter touch regulatory regime; as well as the potential 
to raise capital for financing future investment relatively cheaply (Helm and 
Tindall 2009; Birchall 2002). In our case studies we take public ownership to be 
a broad term which encompasses all types of companies which essentially 
restrict ownership and control rights in ways broadly similar to traditional SOEs 
and municipally owned utilities. Public ownership thus encompasses both 
traditional forms of public ownership and new forms of public involvement. 
 
This paper is motivated by five current challenges facing the wider energy sector, 
and the power sector in particular. These challenges set the scene for the 
analysis we set out in the next section and for the case studies. While we do not 
necessarily accept that these challenges are equally legitimate in all jurisdictions, 
they are perceived to be important by political decision makers in many 
jurisdictions and in each case they do cast doubt on the universal applicability of 
a wholly privately owned, competitive and independently regulated electricity 
supply industry. 
 
First, even after 20 or more years of electricity market liberalisation, 
reform remains a work in progress. As noted in Pollitt (2009)’s review of 
progress with electricity liberalisation in the European Union (EU), it is difficult 
to find conclusive evidence of the consistently beneficial effects of the reforms 
actually implemented in many countries. There are examples of successful 
reform (e.g. UK, Nordic countries, Chile and Argentina)3 but there are notable 
reforms which have stalled (e.g. in many US states, including California, and in 
South Africa, Turkey and Ukraine) and many others of slow progress (e.g. in 
most continental European countries, China and Brazil)4. Public ownership 
                                                 
2 See Pollitt (1995) for a general discussion of ownership forms in the global electricity supply 
industry. 
3 A survey of global lessons from electricity reform can be found in Mota et al. (2005). See for 
example: Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Domah and Pollitt (2001) for the UK; Pollitt (2008b) 
for Argentina; Pollitt (2004) for Chile. 
4 For more mixed experiences see for example: Victor and Heller (2007) on China, Brazil and 
South Africa. 
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remains a significant way in which governments can attempt to insure against 
and potentially prevent undesirable liberalisation outcomes. 
 
Second, climate change and related policies impose significant new 
investment requirements on the power sector. Continuous technological 
improvements (combined with reasonably benign fossil fuel prices) ensured 
significant real unit cost reductions in power costs (and even larger reductions in 
the costs of energy services) between 1900 and 20005. However since then 
climate policy (with the objective of reducing carbon dioxide and equivalent 
Greenhouse gases) and sister policies aimed at promoting the percentage of 
electricity generated from renewable sources (and to reduce demand in high 
demand countries) have begun to significantly drive costs in many power 
sectors. While this has mainly affected OECD countries (particularly within 
Europe) it has implications for developing countries many of whom have 
adopted renewable polices (China has currently 24+ GW of wind capacity – the 
third highest in the world and growing very rapidly). Indirectly, such switching 
of emphasis in OECD countries is likely to have created mixed effects. On one 
hand, there have been learning benefits for other countries in renewables (and 
funding for projects, via the Clean Development Mechanism of the UN FCCC 
which allows for the creation of tradable carbon credits from investments in 
renewable projects in the developing world). On the other, there may have been 
detriments caused by the slowing of technical progress and investment in 
conventional generation technologies. The policy targets at the individual 
country level are ambitious and create significant investment requirements for 
the power sector (perhaps doubling or trebling the sector’s investment 
requirements above a no-policy baseline). Such investments in low carbon (e.g. 
nuclear)  and renewable generation expose investors to substantial government 
policy change risks, especially given that the payback periods for many of these 
investments are long (15-30 years). Public ownership may be a way to ensure 
that the large scale investment requirements of the power sector are met. Indeed 
the initial history of public ownership of the power sector in many countries was 
driven by the perceived inability of the private market to finance the large 
investment requirements of the sector during the electrification period 
(Millward, 2010). 
 
Third, there has been a re-emergence of political concerns about fossil fuel 
energy security in many countries. The EU is a good example of this. Here the 
Ukrainian gas supply crises of 2006 and 2009 resulted in reduced supplies of 
Russian gas into the European Union. This was due to a dispute between Ukraine 
and Russia, which saw the reduction of supplies to the gas transit country 
Ukraine leading to reduced onward flows of Russian gas to the large EU gas 
market. This has heightened concerns about gas security in the EU and reduced 
the willingness of politicians to allow increases in the dependence of the power 
sector on combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants (see Noel, 2009). In 
the UK, for instance, the energy regulator, conducted a significant review project 
into UK energy security (Project Discovery), which examined the need to 
                                                 
5 See Fouquet and Pearson (2006) for the long term trend in the cost of lighting as an example of 
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encourage more LNG terminals, gas storage facilities and alternative sources of 
power and heat (see Ofgem, 2010). More generally there remain concerns about 
‘peak oil’ and ‘peak gas’ – the idea that the global output of oil and gas cannot 
continue to increase in line with growing demand (driven by Chinese and Indian 
industrialisation) without substantial price rises (the factual basis for which is 
well discussed in Mills, 2008). Politically motivated energy security investments 
are by their nature dependent on interference in the normal operation of the 
global energy market (which does handle external political risks quite well in 
most circumstances), this may give rise to public ownership of strategic national 
energy security assets (such as LNG import facilities in small countries).  
 
Fourth, the move towards large scale privatisation with independent 
regulation may raise issues of political legitimacy. Privately owned assets 
regulated by an arms-length government regulator may make it difficult for the 
government to address social concerns around energy markets. A good example 
of this might be the issue of energy poverty and tariffs for vulnerable customers6. 
Private ownership may be more efficient in terms of production costs but may 
not be particularly able to meet democratic concerns about desirable cross-
subsidies between and within customer groups. Thus public ownership may 
have a significant role to play in providing energy services to certain customers 
on a non-economic price basis. It is technically possible to subsidise energy bills 
directly and retain private ownership but public ownership might be a way to do 
this in the absence of an adequate tax and benefit system, or where the 
transaction costs of raising taxes and distributing benefits are significant both for 
the government and for the individual (in terms of filling in subsidy claim forms). 
Public companies can also be seen to have more accountable governance 
processes (e.g. for the selection of directors) and be closer to their customers, if 
they are small. While small private energy companies may incur 
disproportionately high transactions costs (in terms of administrative costs per 
customer), smaller public companies may benefit from low transactions and 
production costs (e.g. the willingness of local directors to forgo fees (see section 
4.1), or ex-employees to work part-time for nothing).  
 
Fifth, the global financial crisis has raised particular concerns in the energy 
sector that the private capital markets may not be able to fund the rising 
investment requirements of the sector. This point is related to the second 
challenge and may be especially likely to be true of investments which rely on 
politically vulnerable government support mechanisms. Of course, this is in the 
context of the need for fiscal restraint and the currently reduced capability of the 
public sector to raise taxes and finance debt. In such circumstances there may be 
a case for increased government participation in energy investment projects in 
order to encourage or replace private sector investment. This may be of 
particular interest if international energy companies reduce their equity and 
debt investments in small developing countries and host country governments 
are forced to step in to ensure that large strategic investments (e.g. in nuclear or 
in LNG facilities) happen or indeed there is more local funding of smaller scale 
                                                 
6 Energy poverty may be defined as occurring when a household spends more than a certain 
percentage of its annual income on domestic energy for power and heat/cooling. In the UK this 
percentage is defined to be 10%. 
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energy projects (such as small wind parks). It is also possible that rapidly 
growing countries such as China or the Gulf States would be in relatively 
advantageous fiscal position at a time when private firms relying on 
international capital markets were less able to invest in projects (as for example 
is the case for nuclear investment in Abu Dhabi).  
 
In what follows we discuss theories of public ownership in Section 2 and their 
relevance to the energy sector and the current challenges facing the energy 
sector. Section 3 discusses the general background to the six case studies. Section 
4 presents the six case studies of continuing public ownership – Middelgunden 
wind park, Denmark; Olkiluoto 3 nuclear plant, Finland; LNG terminals, Chile; 
electricity distribution companies, New Zealand; electricity and gas transmission 
interconnectors, Northern Ireland; and combined heat and power (CHP) based 
energy service companies, Great Britain. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theories of public ownership and their application to 
energy 
We outline four frameworks which examine the role of public vs private 
ownership in regulated sectors, such as energy. These frameworks are grounded 
in the early literature on public choice and the theory of economic regulation. 
For each, we introduce the theoretical results, what they depend on and then ask 
whether the current challenges facing the power industry are likely to imply 
stronger support for public ownership.  
 
We begin with looking at Laffont and Tirole (1993) who examine the incentive 
properties of public versus private ownership. Laffont and Tirole suggest public 
ownership has potentially significant costs associated with: the absence of 
capital market monitoring; soft budget constraints in the public sector; the 
expropriation of investments within the public sector; the lack of precise 
objectives; and its vulnerability to lobbying by interest groups. These costs may 
be offset by potential benefits arising from the ability to target social welfare at 
the expense of profit maximisation. In addition, public ownership has the 
potential to provide a better solution to the principal-agent problem within the 
firm which may be problematic in large private sector companies. They suggest 
that private firm principal-agent problems may be further exacerbated by the 
fact that private firms in regulated markets have conflicting principals – 
shareholders and regulators. Thus private firms may be vulnerable to 
appropriation of investments by managers, while public sector managers may be 
forced to behave inefficiently as a result of poorly defined and difficult to 
measure social goals. Overall, this suggests ambiguous results for the relative 
attractiveness of public vs private firms in heavily regulated industries. To get a 
handle on the net balance of the different incentives, there is a need to examine 
detailed empirical evidence on performance.  
 
We can think about the current challenges facing the energy sector, outlined in 
section 1, and how they relate to the key elements of theory. In terms of the costs 
of public ownership it would seem to be the case that the current fiscal crisis and 
financial crisis might significantly reduce the costs of public ownership. This is 
 6 
because the capital market has shown itself to be a poorer monitor of 
investments than previously thought, while fiscal retrenchment increases the 
likelihood that public sector entities will face harder budget constraints, less 
appropriation of investments than the private sector (where the risk of 
appropriation has risen), more precise objectives, while being less vulnerable to 
obviously costly lobbying. The benefits of public ownership remain largely the 
same as before (though there may be more temptation to privatise existing 
assets to raise revenue). In terms of the principal-agent problems faced by public 
and private firms: the financial crisis and the rising investment requirements 
exacerbate the problem of multiple principals as the regulator becomes more 
demanding, while public sector firms in theory benefit from being better able to 
meet clearer social goals (driven by quantitative targets for renewable 
penetration and for carbon and demand reduction). The case for some public 
ownership therefore looks stronger on incentive grounds (albeit relative to a low 
base in many countries).  
 
Hart et al. (1997) look at the incentives in public-private partnerships with a 
view to asking why services cannot be contracted out to the private sector. 
Essentially this approach focuses on why the public sector cannot simply 
contract for public goods or services for poor consumers. Indeed this would 
seem to be a key issue in the power sector – clearly it is possible to contract for 
renewables, carbon reducing investments such as nuclear, demand reduction, 
energy security investments etc. In many jurisdictions this is precisely what is 
happening. Hart et al. conclude that there are only a narrow range of 
circumstances where public ownership of the service providing assets would be 
preferable to contracting out to the private sector. These are: where the risk of 
non-contractible quality loss is serious; competition for the supply of the service 
is weak (i.e. there are a lack of bidders, particularly in successive contracting 
rounds); consumer choice is ineffective in punishing underperformance on the 
contract; and where the bidding firms don’t care about the reputation loss of 
under-performance. 
 
Applying this approach to the current challenges facing the energy sector, the 
key issues include the ability to run competitive auctions for the supply of 
publicly procured goods (though they are often paid for by levies on energy 
consumers) and the ability to punish contractual underperformance. Clearly in 
some countries there are issues about how many energy companies could 
credibly bid in government investment competitions and indeed maintaining 
some part-publicly owned companies may be a way of preventing unhelpful 
consolidation of the industry. More use of auctions might create private 
incentives to consolidate the industry and hence lead to a natural re-emergence 
of monopoly companies. Similarly many large investment projects – such as 
nuclear power plants and LNG facilities may be one-offs - particularly in small 
countries – delivered by special purpose vehicles. In these cases consumer choice 
and reputation effects may be limited and some direct government participation 
may be justified because of the vulnerability of leveraged investment vehicles to 
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bankruptcy.7 This suggests that smarter procurement from the private sector 
will be necessary to maintain the strength of the case for 100% private 
ownership of publicly procured goods such as low carbon investments. 
Gilbert and Newbery (1994) focus on the incentives on regulators to appropriate 
private firm investments. They have in mind a price-setting utility regulator facing a 
privately owned monopoly service provider. The private monopolist first has to 
decide on the level of investment and the regulator then decides on the regulated price 
for the services. In a repeated game there may be multiple investments a different 
dates and repeated price resets. Gilbert and Newbery show that the private monopolist 
will invest when: 
(1-P)(c-b) > r  
 
Where P=the probability of a low demand state (D=1-s, rather than high demand 
D=1); c is the marginal cost of the alternative company (i.e. the nationalised 
monopolist); b is the private monopoly’s marginal cost; r=cost of capital + 
depreciation. This implies private investment is more likely when demand 
expected to be high, the cost advantage of the monopolist is higher and when the 
cost of capital is lower. This is because appropriation is less likely because the 
nationalisation involves higher operating and capacity reduction costs for the 
regulator, and investment payback is faster. 
 
They also show that the regulator will appropriate the investment by setting low 
regulated prices and running the risk of the private monopolist exiting (via 
bankruptcy) when: 
 
 
 
Where social weight on profits; i=discount rate of regulator. 
 
This implies that the higher the discount rate, the lower the social weight on 
profits and the higher the probability of low demand the more likely the 
regulator is to appropriate via setting low regulated prices and driving the 
private monopolist towards bankruptcy or reducing its long term incentives to 
invest. 
 
Applying this in the current context, we might suggest that current financial and 
fiscal crisis reduces the social weight on profits (and the political and regulatory 
desire to support profitable private firms) and leads to a higher social discount 
rate (as quick fixes become more attractive). Idiosyncratic  private investments 
with strong government involvement via the planning process are at less of a 
cost advantage in construction and given their low operating costs relative to 
capital cost impose lower increases in running costs if nationalised since their 
cost structure is locked in at construction (particularly for wind parks and 
nuclear power plants). There is low actual demand growth and hence a capital 
strike by the private sector is less of a threat to the government (in terms of 
leading to capacity shortages) than it might have been. Taken together this does 
                                                 
7 Though if these investments are undertaken by global multinationals seeking business in other 
countries, this effect may not be as significant as it might appear. 
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seem to suggest that appropriation by regulators of private sector investments is 
more likely in the light the current challenges.8 
 
Finally, we turn to risk allocation issues. A helpful synthesis of the literature on 
efficient risk allocation between the public and private sectors is contained in the 
World Bank’s Risk Allocation and Sharing Tool Kit9. This suggests that the 
following risks are best handled by the private sector: economic and financing 
risks; construction risks; operational risks; and commercial risks. The risks most 
efficiently handled by the public sector are political and legal risks.  
 
The issue with the current challenges is whether the optimal risk allocation is 
changing. The economic and financing risk advantages of the private sector are 
diminished in a financial crisis, if capital is restricted by private banks need to 
rebuild their balance sheets. Construction risks for large first-of-a-kind 
investments are significant, while the benefits in terms of learning accrue to 
others (followers). This increases the case for the public sector shouldering a 
part of first of a kind construction risks (e.g. for nuclear power plants).10 
Commercial risks in terms of the ability to sell the electricity, gas or carbon 
reduction may be increased if there is a threat to the continuation of liberalised 
energy and emissions markets (as there would appear to be in the EU – see 
Pollitt, 2009, and Ofgem, 2010). A general increase in the political and legal risks 
facing the sector, as it struggles to meet the government targets imposed on it, 
would also argue for increased public ownership. Thus overall it would seem to 
be the case that the context and nature of risks favour increasing public sector 
involvement via public ownership or the shifting of financial liability on to the 
public sector (which itself may improve the case for public ownership).11 
 
Taken together all four of the theoretical approaches we examine do seem to 
suggest that the current challenges facing the power sector do improve the case 
for some form of public involvement in the industry. 
 
3. Introduction to our six public involvement cases 
A key starting point for the discussion of actual cases is the observation that 
public ownership has never gone away in the energy sector. Even in the EU 
where there has been significant and co-ordinated market liberalisation – public 
ownership has never been challenged as part of the liberalisation process and 
privatisation remains patchy and incomplete in many countries, as shown in 
Figure 1 below: 
                                                 
8 This is not to say that there are not significant appropriation risks within the public sector. 
Public ownership itself may be a vehicle for the appropriation of taxpayer and customer wealth 
by public sector employees and managers, politicians and civil servants (see for example Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994).  
9 See www.worldbank.org 
10 This relates to the fact that such projects might be ‘too big to fail’, with an implied guarantee 
from the state to underwrite the completion of the project should the private sector fail. 
11 It is important to point out that shifting risk onto the public sector is not necessarily a good 
thing. The public sector may be exposing itself to significant risks that it poorly understands (in 
contrast to the situation when these risks are left with the private sector). It may also attempt to 
manage such risks by incurring the significant transaction costs associated with very tight and 
detailed regulation which may impose large costs of its own. 
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Figure 1: Electricity Sector ownership in selected EU countries 
Source: OECD international regulation database, 2009
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Austria
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Rep.
Spain
Sweden
UK
Public Mostly Public Mixed Mostly Private Private
 
Indeed what is striking is that, looking internationally, many of the jurisdictions 
with the most significant liberalisation in terms of the opening up to competition 
of both wholesale and retail electricity markets retain significant public 
ownership12. Littlechild (2006) identified the UK, Victoria, New South Wales, 
Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, Texas and Ohio as leading the world in terms of 
retail market opening (in addition to having competitive wholesale markets). 
Several of these leaders have significant continuing public ownership, for 
example New Zealand, New South Wales, Norway and Sweden. Apart from the 
UK, there has been only limited movement towards full privatisation (where 
private ownership was not initially dominant) and all retain some public or co-
operative ownership in energy. 
 
Therefore it is important to acknowledge that liberalised electricity markets 
seem to be able to accommodate some degree of continuing public ownership 
(albeit naturally reduced somewhat by the free entry of private firms). Equally, 
we should point out that the type of public ownership that continues in these 
jurisdictions is not the classic SOE or monopoly municipally owned utility. 
Indeed, while privatisation is not a requirement of liberalisation, some vertical 
and horizontal unbundling of SOEs is a requirement of typical liberalisation 
programmes. This often, at least initially, creates more and / or smaller public 
companies (e.g. Turkey, China, New Zealand). 
 
The picture that our case studies suggest is one where continuing public 
involvement in energy is much more varied than before and involves a large 
variety of different capital structures and governance arrangements. It also 
                                                 
12 Though the table understates the influence of cross border competition within Europe which 
does reduce the influence of domestic state owned enterprises.  
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reveals that public entities remain involved in all of the significant investment 
types in the power system. 
 
Thus we chose six types of cases, where the current challenges can be clearly 
seen to be in operation. The first (section 4.1) is an offshore wind farm in 
Denmark and is a classic climate policy inspired investment, also motivated by a 
desire for domestic energy security, displaying significant local accountability 
and a range of sources of finance. The second (section 4.2) is a first-of-a-kind 
nuclear power plant in Finland. This is also climate policy and domestic energy 
security policy inspired and very risky for the private sector.  The third (section 
4.3) is a pair of LNG re-gasification (import) plants in Chile. These are large 
energy security inspired investments. They are difficult to finance in the context 
of a moderately sized developing country that might find attracting foreign 
capital for a large project difficult.13  The fifth (section 4.4) examines local 
electricity distribution in New Zealand. Here we see a range of different types of 
public ownership co-existing within a competitive national wholesale and retail 
power market. These companies face the full range of current energy challenges 
with a particular emphasis on the need for local accountability. The fourth 
(section 4.5) is a group of three transmission infrastructure investments in 
Northern Ireland. These are classic price regulated sunk investments subject to 
significant appropriation risks and requiring local accountability in their use. The 
sixth (section 4.6) looks at models of combined heat and power (CHP) based 
energy service companies (ESCOs) in Great Britain. The impetus to set up these 
companies is the desire to reduce local council energy costs and to meet social 
objectives in providing cheap power and heat to poor tenants in council housing, 
hence requiring strong local accountability. They are further motivated by local 
climate change policy objectives, themselves inspired by national and 
international targets. Interestingly these ESCOs display a range of ownership 
forms. The linkages between the six cases studies are reviewed in section 4.7. 
                                                 
13 Though Chile has a very low country risk premium for a developing country. See 
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/countryrisk.htm (Accessed 24 September 2010). 
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4. Case studies in modern public ownership 
Table 1: Summary of ownership structures involved in the case studies 
Case study Industry Ownership Share 
1. Denmark – 
Middelgrunden offshore 
wind farm 
Electricity 
generation  
Consumer cooperative 
State ownership 
Consumer-owned energy 
companies 
50% 
37% 
13% 
 
2. Finland – Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant 
Electricity 
generation 
Large industrial consumers 
Utilities with part municipal 
ownership 
57% 
43% 
3. (a) Chile – Quintero 
LNG terminal 
Gas production Private 
State ownership 
80% 
20% 
3. (b) Chile – Mejillones 
LNG terminal 
Gas production Private 
State ownership 
50% 
50% 
4. (a) New Zealand – 
Vector 
Electricity 
distribution 
Consumer trust 
Private 
75.1% 
24.9% 
4. (b) New Zealand – 
Orion 
Electricity 
distribution 
Local authorities 100% 
4. (c) New Zealand – 
Eastland Network 
Electricity 
distribution 
Community trust 100% 
5. Northern Ireland – 
Moyle interconnector 
Electricity 
transmission 
Member-owned – mutual 
ownership model 
100% 
6. (a) Great Britain – 
Aberdeen ESCO 
Electricity/heat 
generation and 
retail 
Local council – not-for-profit 
status 
100% 
6. (b) Great Britain – 
Sheffield ESCO 
Electricity/heat 
generation and 
retail 
Private finance initiative  100% 
(35-year 
contract) 
 
4.1 Wind power in Denmark 
 
In 2008, Denmark had an installed wind capacity of 3157 MW (Danish Energy 
Agency). In absolute terms, a number of other European countries are ahead. 
Germany, for example, has the largest installed capacity with over 23,000 MW in 
2008, followed by Spain with almost 17,000 MW14. What makes the Danish case 
unique is that wind capacity now makes up almost 20% of the country’s total 
electricity production, as can be seen from Figure 2.  
 
 
Achieving this high share of wind in the energy mix has not happened overnight. 
Danish energy policy has been supportive of renewable energy development 
since the 1980s. There has also been a bottom-up push for wind through an 
organized grass-roots movement (Lipp, 2007). During the 1970s, the first wave 
of modern wind turbine development came from private individuals without any 
                                                 
14 See EWEA (undated). 
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government support. Since then, the Danish government has encouraged local 
private ownership of wind turbines.  
 
Table 2: Denmark at a glance 
Total electricity generation 
2008 
36,413 GWh 
Total gas demand 2008 190,888 TJ 
GDP per capita 2008 ($ PPP 
constant 2005) 
$34,004 
 
GDP growth 2007 1.65% 
GDP growth 2008 -1.14% 
Electricity price for 
households 2008 (including 
tax) 
$0.396/kWh 
Population 2008 5,493,621 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators; IEA – Electricity 
information; EIA – Electricity prices for households 
 
Figure 2: Denmark electricity mix 2008 
 
Source: IEA – OECD Electricity and Heat Generation 
 
A feed-in tariff was introduced in 1993. Since then, it has been central to the 
diffusion of wind energy in the country. The tariff obliged utilities to pay 85% of 
the price paid by consumers for wind-generated electricity. This represented a 
generous subsidy to wind because total taxes on household electricity use in 
Denmark are over 50% of final prices (IEA, 2009a, p. 112)   There have been a 
number of complementary policies including subsidies (30% of investment) and 
tax exemptions (up to 7,000 kWh tax-free electricity generation) for private wind 
turbine owners (Lipp, 2007). The tax refund amounted to 0.27 DKK per kWh (3.7 
eurocents per kWh) (Meyer, 2007). In 1999, Denmark decided to replace the 
feed-in tariff with a system based on a renewable portfolio standard and tradable 
green certificates. The feed-in tariff was removed gradually from 2001 (Bolinger, 
2001). Wind generators are now paid the wholesale market price plus an 
environmental premium of approximately 0.013 €/kWh (Lipp, 2007).  
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Table 3: Onshore wind ownership 
 Utilities/corporate 
owners (%) 
Farmers (%) Cooperatives 
(%) 
Total 2009 
wind 
capacity 
(MW) 
UK 98 1 0.5 4,051 
Germany 55 35 10 25,777 
Spain 99+ <0.5 0 19,149 
Denmark 12 63 25 3,465 
Source: Pollitt (2010); The Wind Power 
 
As shown in Table 3, wind ownership in Denmark has been largely community-
based in contrast to other European countries. This started out as a bottom-up 
push from communities and was later encouraged by government policy 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Middelgrunden offshore wind farm is an 
example of a hybrid form of ownership that started out as a partnership between 
a local municipal utility, Copenhagen Energy, and a local cooperative.  
 
 
Middelgrunden offshore wind farm 
Middelgrunden wind farm was built in 2000. It has a total of 20 wind turbines 
with a capacity of 2MW each, supplying approximately 4% of total power for the 
city of Copenhagen (with a total population of approximately 530,000). Total 
investment costs for the project came to €44.9 million, €26.1 million of which 
were for the wind turbines. Copenhagen Energy and the Middelgrunden 
cooperative each own 10 wind turbines in the farm (Sorensen et al., 2002).  
 
The Middelgrunden Wind Turbine Cooperative was established in 1997 as a 
private partnership under Danish law, i.e. a partnership between consumers who 
have direct ownership of the turbines. It was the first community-owned 
offshore wind project and also the largest community-owned wind project at the 
time (Bolinger, 2001). The cooperative had a total of 8,650 members at the 
outset with 40,500 shares (in total). Each share represents production of 1,000 
kWh/year and was sold for 4,250 DKK (€567).  An average shareholder would 
have invested a total of €2655. Over a 20-year period, the typical rate of return 
after depreciation would be 7.5% (Larsen et al., 2005).  The transition away from 
the feed-in tariff may have an impact on the rate of return due to uncertainty 
over output sales. Some see this uncertainty as a barrier to further cooperative-
based wind development in Denmark. The worst-case scenario for 
Middelgrunden is a rate of return of 4.44% if output cannot be sold once the 
feed-in tariff comes to an end (Bolinger, 2001).   
 
Five partners of the cooperative are elected to a management committee as well 
as two substitutes by the partnership assembly, where each partner has one 
vote. Management partners are elected for a term of 2 years. Not more than one 
management partner can be from the same household. The management 
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committee as a whole or members of the committee can be dismissed by simple 
majority at the partnership assembly15. 
 
Table 4: Middelgrunden wind turbine ownership 
Organisation Share Ownership Financing 
Middelgrunden Wind 
Turbine Cooperative 
50% Private partnership; 
8,650 members with a 
total of 40,500 shares 
Entirely equity-
based through 
members 
Dong Energy 50% 74% state-owned 
utility 
10.88% SEAS-NVE 
Holding 6.95% Syd 
Energy Net (both 
energy cooperatives) 
57% equity and 
43% debt-financed 
 
The remaining 50% of the project is now owned by Dong Energy which was 
founded in 2006 after the merger of six Danish energy companies, including 
Copenhagen Energy. The Danish state is the principal shareholder with 74% 
ownership as of the beginning of 2010. Among the minority shareholders are 
two of the largest consumer-owned energy companies in the country. SEAS-NVE 
Holding has a 10.88% share and is Denmark’s largest energy cooperative. Syd 
Energi Net has a 6.95% share and is Denmark’s third largest energy company. 
Dong Energy as a whole is 57% equity and 43% debt-financed. The debt is 
predominantly fixed-rate with a high degree of certainty. In 2009, the company 
issued bonds in the Euro market totally €2 billion and secured loans of €250 
million from the European Investment Bank (Dong Energy, 2009). 
 
Middelgrunden wind farm illustrates how a number of different forms of public 
ownership can coexist and complement each other. The local community is 
involved directly through the wind farm cooperative. At the same time, the wider 
Danish community is involved indirectly through large consumer-owned energy 
companies. Finally, the state retains a central position as majority shareholder in 
Dong Energy.  
                                                 
15 Source: Middelgrunden Wind Cooperative website. 
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4.2 Nuclear power in Finland: Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
 
Table 5: Finland at a glance 
Total electricity generation 
2008 
77,145 GWh 
Total gas demand 2008 179,080 TJ 
GDP per capita 2008 ($ PPP 
constant 2005) 
$33,377 
GDP growth 2007 4.2% 
GDP growth 2008 0.92% 
Electricity price for 
households 2008 (including 
tax) 
$0.172/kWh 
 
Population 2008 5,313,399 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators; IEA – Electricity 
information; EIA – Electricity prices for households 
 
There are currently four operating nuclear power reactors in Finland, in two 
different power plants. A fifth is under construction at Olkiluoto power plant and 
is due to be completed in 2012. The government in April 2010 approved plans 
for a further two units to be constructed after 2012. The nuclear share of total 
electricity production was 30% in 2007, as can be seen from Figure 3.  
 
Olkiluoto power plant is located on Olkiluoto island in western Finland. The 
plant has two operating nuclear reactors with installed capacity of 860 MW each. 
A third reactor is under construction with a net output of approximately 1,600 
MW and a fourth is being planned. At present, the plant accounts for 64% of total 
nuclear installed capacity in Finland and this figure will increase when the third 
reactor becomes operational.  Support for nuclear power in Finland has been 
relatively stable in the last few decades. A 2006 survey conducted by the nuclear 
industry shows that 50% are in favour and 20% are against nuclear power.  
Public acceptance of further nuclear developments – beyond those already 
planned – is, however, not so clear (IEA, 2007).   
Olkiluoto 3, the third reactor under construction, is the first new nuclear build in 
a liberalized market (IEA, 2009a). The total cost of the project is approximately 
€3 billion. The financing structure is innovative and builds on the structure for 
the previous reactors. The three reactors are owned and operated by 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). TVO was founded in 1969 by 16 Finnish industrial 
and power companies to produce electricity for shareholders at cost price. The 
first reactor was connected to the grid in 1978 and the second in 1980. The 
organization as a whole is 43% owned by local utilities and 57% by large 
industrial consumers. Pohjolan Voima OJ (PVO) and Fortum Power and Heat are 
the largest shareholders. The majority of PVO’s shares are owned by companies 
in the Finnish pulp and paper industry. Municipalities and utilities owned by 
municipalities make up the remainder of the shareholders. Fortum is a stock 
market listed utility in which the state has a 51% stake (TVO, 2009).  
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Figure 3: Finland electricity mix 2008 
 
Source: IEA – OECD Electricity and Heat Generation 
 
The board of TVO can have a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 10 members. 
Shareholders who own more than 20% and less than 50% have the right to 
appoint 3 members to the board. Elections take place annually at the 
shareholders’ meeting. 
 
Table 6: Olkiluoto 3 shareholders 
Organisation Share Ownership 
PVO 60.2% Several companies in the 
pulp and paper industry; 
municipalities; 
municipally owned 
utilities 
Fortum 25% 51% state-owned stock-
market-listed utility 
Oy Mankala AB 8.1% Subsidiary of a utility 
owned by the city of 
Helsinki 
EPV 6.6% Regional energy 
procurement company 
owned by 21 local 
utilities, mainly 
municipally owned 
Source: IEA (2007) 
 
TVO has released 3 series of shares: the first is for electricity produced by 
current nuclear units; the second for electricity produced by Olkiluoto 3; and the 
third for TVO’s share of electricity produced by the Finnish Meri-Pori coal plant. 
A majority of the Olkiluoto 3 shares are privately owned, however there is also 
considerable state and municipal ownership. Table 6 summarises the 
shareholders involved and their ownership structures (IEA, 2007).  
 
Olikiluoto 3 is 75% debt-financed. The remaining 25% is provided by 
subordinated debt and equity from the shareholders. The project is financed on 
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TVO’s balance sheet, which means that recourse on loans is tied to TVO as a 
company and not just to the Olikiluoto3 project itself. The long-term contracts to 
provide shareholders with electricity at production cost essentially transfer the 
project risks to the shareholders. This allows for a higher level of low-cost debt 
financing. This model of financing is particularly appropriate in the Finnish 
nuclear context given the high capital costs and high levels of industrial 
electricity demand. It also allows for risks to be shared across different types of 
actors, i.e. public, private and municipal (IEA, 2007).   
 
The project itself has had significant construction cost problems. The reactor 
technology – third generation nuclear plant using the European Pressurised 
water Reactor (EPR) design – is new and very advanced. Construction cost risk 
lies with the consortium of Areva and Siemens that is delivering the reactor as a 
turnkey project (IEA, 2007). Costs are currently estimated to be around 50% 
over budget and the project was originally due to be delivered in 2009 but is now 
not expected to start commercial operation until 2012 (Kanter, 2009).  
 
 
4.3 LNG in Chile 
 
Table 7: Chile at a glance 
Total electricity generation 
2007 
58,509 GWh 
Total gas demand 2008 
(2007) 
84,028 TJ 
(155,995 TJ) 
GDP per capita 2008 (PPP 
constant 2005) 
$13,333 
GDP growth 2007 4.68% 
GDP growth 2008 3.16% 
Electricity price for 
households 2008 (including 
tax) 
$0.195/kWh 
Population 2008 16,803,952 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators; IEA – Electricity information; 
EIA – Electricity prices for households 
 
The role of the state in LNG terminal ownership in Chile is driven above all by the 
need to diversify the Chilean energy mix. Chile does not have any significant local 
gas resources.  Imports of gas from Argentina commenced in 1997, mainly for 
use in thermal power generation and for the industrial sector. Argentina has had 
difficulty meeting its own gas supply needs, however, and since 2005 exports to 
Chile have been falling. Supply cuts from Argentina started in 2004. In 2007, cuts 
reached up to 95% of committed volumes (Barroso et al., 2008). This has had a 
significant impact on the share of gas in electricity generation in Chile. In 2007, 
the share of gas in total electricity production was 8%.  As can be seen from 
Figure 5, this comes at the end of a phase of expansion starting at the end of the 
1990s and subsequent decline from 2004 onwards (IEA, 2009b). 
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Figure 4: Chile electricity mix 2007 
 
Source: IEA – OECD Electricity and Heat Generation 
 
Chile’s LNG programme is thus designed to reduce uncertainty in gas supply as 
well as to meet growing demand. The country’s first LNG terminal was 
constructed in Quintero in central Chile. The first delivery to the terminal took 
place in July 2009 and the terminal is expected to be fully operational by the 
third quarter of 2010. The development of the terminal was phased in this way 
to accelerate the initial opening. The capacity of the terminal is 3.5 bcm but could 
later be expanded to 7 bcm (IEA, 2009b). This corresponds to between 1.5mt and 
2.5 mt per annum. The initial capacity of the terminal is equivalent to 
approximately 40% of Chile’s current demand for natural gas (BG Group, 2009).  
 
The total capital cost of the terminal is $1.1 billion. GNL Quintero S.A. was 
incorporated in 2007 as a public-private joint venture between ENAP, Endesa 
Chile, Metrogas S.A. of Santiago and BG Group. BG Group has a 40% share and the 
other three partners have 20% shares. ENAP is the state-owned oil and gas 
company; Endesa Chile is a private power generator and Metrogas is a private 
gas distributor. BG Group’s partners have capacity rights in the terminal. They 
have entered into a 21-year contract with BG Group to off-take up to 2.3 bcm 
from its global supply portfolio. Financing for the project is through a 15-year 
deal with 9 banks and BG Group affiliates. The loan is structured as non-recourse 
senior secured financing (BG Group, 2009).  
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Figure 5: Electricity generation Chile 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
The second Chilean LNG terminal is located in the North at Mejillones, a region 
rich in minerals. This part of the country is even more dependent on gas and has 
few alternatives in the short-term.   The project is a joint venture between 
multinational energy company GDF Suez and the state-owned copper mining 
company Codelco. Each partner owns 50% of the 1.8 bcm capacity terminal. The 
total investment cost came to $500 million. The terminal received its first 
shipment in February 2010 and started full commercial operations in May 2010. 
Capacity of the terminal is equivalent to approximately 1,100 MW of electricity 
generation. This is a substantial addition to the existing 3,596 MW capacity in the 
SING market of Northern Chile (GNL Mejillones, 2010).  
 
Table 8:  Summary of LNG terminal ownership Chile 
LNG Terminal Organisation Share Ownership % public 
ownership 
Quintero 
(Central) 
BG Group 40% Publicly listed on LSE 20% 
 ENAP 20% State-owned oil and gas 
company 
 
 Endesa Chile 20% Private power generator  
 Metrogas  20% Private gas distributor  
Mejillones 
(North) 
GDF Suez 50% Multinational  publicly 
listed energy company 
50% 
 Codelco 50% State-owned copper 
company 
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The strong mining customer base in the northern region is central to the viability 
of the project. LNG supply has been contracted by mining clients, including 
Codelco, BHP Billiton, Xstrata and Anglo America, as well as power generators in 
Chile’s northern SING grid. Price agreements for LNG supply are tied to 
investment in the project rather than to market prices for the initial contract 
period from the beginning of 2010 to September 2012. After this initial phase, 
the clients will be able to avail of LNG supply at a lower price (Business News 
Americas, 2008; GNL Mejillones, 2010) 
 
Table 9: LNG regasification terminals in South America 
Country Terminal Start up Capacity (bcm) 
Argentina Bahía Bianca 
GasPort (South) 
May 2008 1.5 
 Pecém FSRU 
(North) 
January 2009 2 
Brazil Guanabara Bay 
(Rio de Janeiro) 
March 2009 4.8 
 Tergas, Rio 
Grande 
2013 2.2 
Chile Quintero (Central) 
(BG) 
June 2009 3.4 
 Mejillones (North) 
(GDF Suez) 
2010 1.8 
Source: IEA, 2009b 
 
Chile is not alone in developing LNG capacity. Table 9 summarises recent LNG 
developments in South America. One of the main issues in developing LNG 
infrastructure is the cost of LNG relative to other sources of power generation, 
particularly coal. In the Chilean case, consumers may be willing to pay a 
premium for LNG as a substitute for imports from Argentina. It is not so clear, 
however, whether LNG can be competitive with coal for power generation 
(Barroso et al., 2008; IEA, 2009b). 
 
 
4.4 Electricity distribution in New Zealand 
 
In 1993, electricity supply authorities in New Zealand were corporatized. 
Ownership of most of the assets was transferred to trusts, cooperatives and a 
small number of privately owned companies. The prevalence of the trust model 
of ownership owes itself to the process of corporatizing rural Electric Power 
Boards (EPBs). The boards had been established in the early 1900s to install and 
manage network assets on behalf of consumers. When it came to transforming 
the boards into commercial companies, it was not clear who the owners should 
be. All consumers served by the boards at the time of restructuring were deemed 
to own the EPBs. As a result, a large number of trust-owned companies emerged 
(Bertram, 2006). 
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Table 10: New Zealand at a glance 
Total electricity generation 
2008 
43,774 GWh 
Total gas demand 2008  159,936 TJ 
GDP per capita 2008 (PPP 
constant 2005) 
$25,011 
 
GDP growth 2007 3.09% 
GDP growth 2008 -1.1% 
Electricity price for 
households 2008 (including 
tax) 
$0.164/kWh 
 
Population 2008 4,268,900 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators; IEA – Electricity 
information; EIA – Electricity prices for households 
 
Since 1999, distribution companies have been required to specialize in 
distribution services and to be owned separately from competitive activities 
such as generation and retail (Bertram, 2006). Table 11 summarises the main 
types of ownership structure and gives some examples from the power sector.  
 
Figure 6: New Zealand electricity mix 2008 
 
Source: IEA – OECD Electricity and Heat Generation 
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Table 11: Electricity distribution companies in New Zealand 
Ownership type Total Examples 
Consumer trust 18 (plus 1 with 
minority ownership) 
Counties Power, Mainpower New 
Zealand, The Lines Company, 
Vector, Alpine Energy (40% 
consumer trust; 60% local 
authority) 
Local authority 4 Aurora Energy, Orion New 
Zealand 
Community trust 2 Eastland Network, WEL Networks 
Public 1 (plus 2 with 
minority ownership) 
Powerco, Horizon Energy 
Distribution (77% consumer 
trust, 23% public), Vector (75.1% 
consumer trust, 24.9% public) 
Cooperative  1 Electricity Ashburton 
Other 2 Nelson Electricity (equal ownership 
by two consumer trusts; OtagoNet 
Joint Venture (2 consumer trusts 
and local authority) 
Total 28  
Source: Evans and Meade (2005) 
 
In the early years of reform, New Zealand adopted a light-handed approach to 
regulating electricity distribution networks that relied solely on information 
disclosure. In 2001, the Commerce Commission was given the task of regulating 
both distribution and transmission networks. Following a thorough review of 
pricing practices in the industry by the Commission, the government decided to 
establish a dedicated industry regulator to oversee developments going forward. 
The Electricity Commission was created in 2003 and is now tasked with setting 
price and revenue caps, managing information disclosure, guiding new 
investment and coordinating the investment plans of different industry actors 
(Bertram 2006). Since 2008, the Commerce Commission has been responsible 
for setting and monitoring price path and quality thresholds for distribution and 
transmission. The main responsibility of the Commerce Commission over and 
above the Electricity Commission is to promote market competition and 
safeguard the long-term interests of consumers (Commerce Commission, 2007).    
Electricity distribution companies that are fully owned by consumer trusts, 
community trusts or cooperatives are exempt from price-quality regulation. They are 
still, however, subject to information disclosure rules set out by the Electricity 
Commission.  
 
In the next three subsections, we describe the ownership model, board 
appointment process, capital and share structure for three markedly different 
electricity distribution companies in New Zealand.  
 
Consumer trust 
Vector is the largest electricity distribution company in New Zealand. It started 
out in 1994 as Mercury Energy Limited and was owned in full by the Auckland 
Energy Consumer Trust (AECT). In 1999 when it sold its electricity retail 
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business, it changed its name to Vector Limited. In 2005, the company was 
floated on the New Zealand stock exchange in order to raise capital to buy gas 
company NGC Holdings. The AECT remains the majority shareholder with 75.1% 
ownership. The remaining shares are held by a variety of individual and 
institutional shareholders. Two of Vector’s seven board members are AECT 
trustees. Trustee elections take place every three years. All elected trustees are 
electricity customers that live within the area of the Trust.  
 
Vector has expanded its portfolio to include not only electricity distribution 
assets but also gas transmission pipelines, fibre optic networks, energy metering 
businesses and wind generation. Total electricity assets came to NZD 3.2 billion 
in 2009 (USD 2 billion)16. Vector’s capital structure is divided almost equally 
between debt and equity: 48% debt and 52% equity (a total of NZD 5.5 billion or 
USD 3.5 billion) (Vector, 2009).  
 
AECT is fully equity-financed (total of NZD 300 million – USD 190.7 million – in 
2009). In 2009, AECT received a total of 99.5 million in dividends from Vector. 
This was distributed as a NZD 320 (USD 203) dividend to all 304,906 eligible 
beneficiaries, i.e. electricity customers living in the Trust’s area (AECT).   
 
Local authority 
Orion New Zealand Limited was originally called Southpower when it was 
established in 1989 as a joint venture between Christchurch City Council, the 
Central Canterbury Electric Power Board, Riccarton Electricity and the Port Hills 
energy authority. Ownership was transferred to three local authorities in the 
supply area in 1992: Christchurch City Council, Selwyn District Council and 
Banks Peninsula District Council. Southpower sold its retail business in 1998 and 
the networks business was renamed Orion New Zealand Limited.  In 1999, the 
company was delisted. Orion now has two shareholders: Christchurch City 
Council (89.275%) and Selwyn District Council (10.725%). The debt to equity 
ratio of the company for 2009 (total liabilities/shareholder equity) was 0.39. The 
group’s policy is to maintain a strong capital base in order to ensure confidence 
from the market, investors and creditors in the future of the business.  
 
Total financial liabilities on the 2009 balance sheet for Orion were NZD 69.2 
million (USD 44 million). Almost 70% of these liabilities took the form of 
unsecured loans.  Interest rates are floating based on bank bill rates plus a 
margin. The average rate as at the end of March 2009 was 3.83% and was 8.95% 
the previous year. 
 
There are six non-executive directors in Orion. Five of these are appointed by the 
company’s majority shareholder and one by the minority shareholder. At least 
one third of the directors must retire at the annual meeting but they can be 
reappointed (Orion, 2009).  
 
                                                 
16 All figures in USD in this section are calculated at the average 2009 exchange rate from the 
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, historical rates for New Zealand.  
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Community trust  
Eastland Network is an example of an electricity distribution company wholly 
owned by a community trust. The Eastland Energy Community Trust was created 
in May 1993. Since then, it has expanded its involvement beyond the energy 
sector. Assets include Eastland Port, Gisborne Airport, as well as land and 
property in the commercial sector. Electricity network assets totalled NZD 152 
million in 2009 (USD 96.6 million) (ECT, 2009). The Trust can have no less than 
five and no more than seven trustees. All trustees are appointed by Gisborne 
District Council. Applications for appointment are advertised each year 
throughout the district. The main criteria for appointment are that the trustees 
are able to represent the interests of the community, as well as to ensure the 
successful operation of the Trust as a business (ECT, 1993).  
 
Table 12: Outstanding loans Eastland Community Trust 
Bank loans Currency Nominal interest rate Face value 2009 
$’000 
Commonwealth bank NZD 3.94% 30,000 
Commonwealth bank – 
call 
NZD 3.3% 1,250 
Commonwealth bank USD 0.5% 3,243 
Westpac Banking 
Corporation 
NZD 3.89% 36,000 
Westpac Banking 
Corporation – call  
NZD 3.6% 1,000 
Total   71,493 
Source: ECT 2009, p. 28 
The purpose of the Trust is to protect the interests of its beneficiaries, i.e. 
electricity consumers in the Trust’s area. In particular, the Trust ensures that 
adequate and affordable electricity supplies reach areas where installation 
and/or maintenance may not be commercially viable. Sustaining economic 
growth in the district by supporting business, community and other initiatives is 
also part of its broader mission.  
 
The debt to equity ratio for the Eastland Community Trust as a whole for 2009 
was 0.69. Borrowings from banks constituted over 60% of total liabilities in 
2009. Table 12 summarises the interest rates and amounts for each of the 
outstanding loans.   
Even though the company is wholly owned by a community trust, only 81% of the 
network’s customers are beneficiaries. This means that the company is not exempt 
from price/quality reviews and must submit information annually to the Electricity 
Commission (ECT, 2009).  
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4.5 Electricity and gas transmission in Northern Ireland 
 
Table 13: United Kingdom at a glance 
Total electricity generation 
2008 
390,321 GWh 
Total gas demand 2008  3,928,633 TJ 
 
GDP per capita 2008 (PPP 
constant 2005) 
$34,204 
 
GDP growth 2007 3.02% 
 
GDP growth 2008 0.71% 
 
Electricity price for 
households 2008 (including 
tax) 
$0.231/kWh 
 
Population 2008 
(Northern Ireland 
61,414,062 
1,775,000) 
 
 
 
Mutual Energy Northern Ireland owns the Moyle Interconnector between 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, the Scotland to Northern Ireland gas pipeline 
(SNIP) and the Belfast gas transmission line. The Moyle interconnector was the 
first asset acquired by the company in 2003 from previous owners Viridian, with 
a capital value of £135 million. The interconnector began full commercial 
operation in 2002. The company, then known as Northern Ireland Energy 
Holdings, purchased SNIP (valued at £107 million) in 2005 and the Belfast gas 
transmission line in 2008 (£109 million). The company was renamed Mutual 
Energy Limited in November 2009.  
 
Figure 7: UK electricity mix 2008 
 
 
 26 
These three assets are central to the energy infrastructure in Northern Ireland 
and, in the case of the interconnector, to the electricity infrastructure of the 
whole island of Ireland. The interconnector has a total capacity of 500MW and 
provides an opportunity to increase competition in Ireland’s Single Electricity 
Market. Figure 8 shows the power transfers between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland from June 2009 to May 2010, including the percentage of total Northern 
Ireland electricity consumption on the right axis. The SNIP is a 24-inch diameter 
pipeline that is 135km long. The pipeline transports gas to Ballyumford Power 
Station which provides over 50% of Northern Ireland’s power. The Belfast gas 
transmission pipeline is connected to the SNIP at Ballyumford and is a 26km 
cross-country pipeline.  
 
The mutual ownership model or the company limited by guarantee is essentially 
owned by members for the benefit of members. It is similar in purpose and 
structure to the consumer or community trust. In companies limited by 
guarantee, the members act as guarantors and there is usually no share capital 
and no shareholders. Financing for each of Mutual Energy’s assets has been 
entirely debt-based. 
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Table 14 summarises the details of the bonds for each of the three assets.  
 
The board of directors of Mutual Energy is elected at the Annual General Meeting 
by company members. There are at least 30 members in the company. They are 
appointed by the board on the recommendation of a selections committee. The 
selections committee includes two non-executive directors, two members and 
two independent representatives nominated by the Northern Ireland Authority 
for Utility Regulation (NIAUR). Members do not receive remuneration and have 
no financial interest in the company. They are selected to ensure adequate 
representation from all stakeholder groups, but particularly from consumers.  
 
Figure 8: Power transfers between Northern Ireland and Scotland 
 
Source: Mutual Energy 2010 
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Table 14: Mutual Energy’s acquisitions 
Asset Acquired Associated 
bond issuance 
Term Real rate 
Moyle 
Interconnector 
April 2003 £135m 30-year 2.94% 
Scotland to 
Northern 
Ireland 
pipeline 
March 2005 £107m 25-year 2.46% 
Belfast gas 
transmission 
pipeline 
March 2008 £109m 40-year 2.21% 
Source: NIEH 2009 
 
Mutual Energy is regulated through licence agreements with NIAUR. Revenue of 
both the gas and electricity businesses is regulated to match debt service costs 
and operating expenditure. In October each year, the actual revenue is reconciled 
with forecast revenue. If there is a shortfall, this can be collected through the 
system operator from electricity customers (NIEH, 2009).  
 
The mutual model transfers equity risk to customers. On the one hand, this 
arrangement allows for reduced cost of capital. In the case of Northern Ireland, 
the model has been justified on the basis that the reduction in costs helps to 
tackle high energy prices. Performance to date shows that this has indeed been 
the case. For the Moyle interconnector, there has been a reported 25% saving on 
the cost of capital over a non-mutual model. It has not been necessary to call on 
electricity customers for any shortfall in revenues. In fact, £11.9m had been set 
aside in accumulated reserves at the end of the 2008/9 financial year (NIEH, 
2009).  
 
On the other hand, one of the main problems identified with the mutual model is 
the lack of internal control. Equity-holders usually perform this role. In Mutual 
Energy, members of the company are appointed to fill this gap. Some argue, 
however, that the regulator essentially steps in and that the mutual model 
becomes nothing more than a “public delivery agency” (Helm and Tindall, 2009, 
p. 430). The share of debt in the capital structure of UK utilities has grown since 
privatisation. As we discussed in the case of the Moyle interconnector, this leads 
to a lower cost of capital because debt-holders have a higher incentive than 
equity-holders to limit risk. Access to debt markets, however, requires a healthy 
balance sheet. Financing new capital investments may become problematic 
particularly at times of economic uncertainty (Helm and Tindall, 2009). Some of 
this risk can, however, be limited as long as existing assets perform well and 
allow reserves to be accumulated, as in the case of the Moyle interconnector.        
 
4.6 ESCOs in Great Britain 
Energy Service Companies (ESCO) take many different forms both in Great 
Britain and internationally.  There is no single definition of an ESCO. The term 
generally implies that an entity is engaged in activities that aim to improve 
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energy efficiency, provide energy savings or reduce carbon emissions (London 
Energy Partnership, 2007). In Great Britain, there have been a number of ESCOs 
established as a means of developing Combined Heat and Power with District 
Heating schemes (CHP-DH). These schemes are community-based and have the 
potential to improve energy efficiency and to provide electricity and heat at 
lower cost to local consumers (Kelly and Pollitt, 2009).  
 
London Energy Partnership (2007, p.4) illustrates how existing schemes in Great 
Britain vary according to the level of public and private sector involvement 
(which ranges from fully public, through mixed ownership to fully private). 
When the private sector enters, there is a degree of risk transfer depending on 
the degree of involvement.  
 
Table 15 compares some CHP-DH schemes by assets, turnover and profit. In the 
next two subsections, we focus on the Aberdeen scheme as an example of an 
initiative driven by a local council and the Sheffield scheme which started out 
with public involvement but was transferred to the private sector.   
 
Table 15: GB District Heating schemes 
Scheme  Cost to build CHP-DH Fixed assets (Present 
Value 2006) 
Annual turnover 
(3 year avg) 
Profit (loss) before 
tax 
(3 year avg) 
 £ million nominal £ million £ million  £  
Barkantine  6.0  3.4  1.1  96,000  
Woking  4.2  13.0  2.3  (41,000)  
Aberdeen  6.5  5.4  0.23  14,522  
Southampton  8.0  6.2  2.8  33,509  
Sheffield  Unavailable  6.5  25.6  2,890,000  
Source: Kelly and Pollitt (2009), p. 14 
 
Aberdeen 
Aberdeen Heat and Power Ltd (AH&P) was established in 2002 as a not-for-
profit company owned in full by Aberdeen City Council. The company was set up 
to manage Combined Heat and Power (CHP) district heating schemes in the city. 
There are currently three completed schemes that provide 900 homes and 7 
council-owned public buildings with space and water heating. The schemes are 
fuelled by mains gas. Plans to expand one of the schemes by installing a biomass 
CHP unit to supply heat to commercial buildings are under way (SSN 2009). The 
initial impetus for the schemes came from the need to address fuel poverty in 
Aberdeen’s council-owned buildings and flats. CHP was found to be the most 
technically and economically efficient way of improving energy efficiency and 
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affordability. The three schemes currently operating are: Stockethill (210kWe); 
Hazlehead (300kWe); and Seaton (1MWe) (Kelly, 2008).  
 
Table 16 describes the financing arrangements for the Aberdeen district heating 
schemes. The investment is supported through a combination of grants and a 
loan underwritten by the City Council. Financing for the bank loan is provided by 
the savings from newly installed energy efficiency measures. This type of 
financing arrangement ensures that the energy efficiency goals of the project 
remain central to its operation.  
 
 
Table 16: Financing arrangements for Aberdeen Heat and Power 
Source of financing Amount (share of 
total investment) 
Details 
Energy Saving Trust, 
Community Energy 
Programme 
£2.68 million 
(41%) 
Grant to stimulate the 
development of CHP 
community heating networks 
(2000-2005) 
Bank loan £3.51 million 
(54%) 
Underwritten by Aberdeen 
City Council; financed through 
savings from new energy 
efficiency measures 
Energy Efficiency 
Commitment  
£273,000 (4%) Small number of grants for 
energy efficiency investments 
associated with the CHP 
schemes 
 
AH&P is owned by Aberdeen City Council but was established as an independent, 
not-for-profit company limited by guarantee. This was an innovative way for the 
Council to overcome its own financial constraints which would have delayed the 
development of a community district heating network considerably. The 
company has a contract with the City Council to provide heat to council buildings 
(King, 2007). AH&P has a board of unpaid directors including two tenant 
representatives, two elected members and five independent directors. A number 
of specialist advisors provide project design and management expertise. The 
company has a contract, for example, with a CHP consultant (ACC, 2004). Any 
surplus income generated from the schemes provides part of the capital for the 
next phases of development of Aberdeen’s district heating network. Current 
expansion plans aim to expand capacity to 3 MWe of electricity and 4.2 MW heat, 
with an estimated total cost of £2.9 million (AH&P, 2010).  
 
Sheffield 
The dominant model for ESCO development in the UK has centred on direct 
municipal involvement.  Sheffield Heat and Power (SH&P) started out this way in 
1988 but is now an example of an ESCO on the private sector end of the 
spectrum. In 2001, Onyx (now Veolia Environmental Services) was awarded a 
35-year Integrated Waste Management contract for Sheffield City Council. The 
company paid the council £47 million at the time (Onyx, 2001).  Included in the 
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contract is the management of a waste-to-energy plant (an energy recovery 
facility) as well as the district heating network and the refuse collection and 
recycling service. The waste-to-energy plant was rebuilt in 2006 as part of the 
agreement with the Council. It now generates up to 21MW of electricity and 
60MW of heat, making it the largest CHP plant to serve a district heating scheme 
in the UK (Kelly, 2008). Over 140 commercial and public as well as 2,800 
residential buildings are connected to the district heating network (Veolia, 
2008).  
 
When Onyx was awarded the waste management contract for Sheffield in 2001, 
Onyx Sheffield was predominantly debt-financed as can be seen from Table 17. 
The split between debt and equity has, however, become more equal since then.  
 
Veolia Environmental Services is the largest private waste disposal company in 
the UK with over 12,500 employees and revenues above £1.3 billion. Veolia has a 
contract with the Sheffield City Council to operate and maintain the district 
heating scheme. The contract covers the entire cycle from waste collection to 
energy delivery. Veolia enters into contracts directly with private customers for 
heat supply. Council-owned housing and public buildings constitute a large part 
of the customer based. Any electricity that is generated is sold to the National 
Grid under an agreement with a guaranteed long-term supply price (Kelly, 
2008).  
Table 17: Onyx Sheffield's capital structure 
Year Total debt Total shareholders’ 
equity 
2001 £3,820,000 £230,000 
2008 £2,827,000 £2,421,000 
Source: Onyx Sheffield, 2001; Veolia ES Sheffield, 2008 
 
The parent company of Veolia Environmental Services is Veolia Environnement. 
Covering a wide spectrum of energy and environmental services, Veolia 
Environnement operates in 72 countries with 2008 revenues of more than €36 
billion. One of Veolia’s main strengths is its ability to approach waste disposal in 
an integrated way. They support an integrated approach to Private Finance 
Initiatives as a means of building new infrastructure for waste management 
(Veolia, 2008). Sheffield district heating network is a good example of this long-
term integrated approach.  
 
4.7 Drivers of ownership models 
The ownership models we have explored have arisen for a variety of reasons, 
often dependent on country or regional context. Looking at our six case studies, 
we can identify three categories of drivers for public or consumer involvement. 
The first is demand-related. Consumers in Denmark, Finland and Chile played a 
central role in pushing for new ownership arrangements in wind, nuclear and 
LNG. In Denmark, the push from communities for wind power development was 
later supported and sustained by policy changes. In Finland and Chile, industrial 
consumer needs as well as uncertainty, particularly in the Chilean case due to 
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difficulties with Argentinian supply, led to the creation of new partnerships and 
innovative financing arrangements.  
 
The second category is social objectives. Meeting the needs of vulnerable 
consumers has been at the heart of many ESCO schemes in Great Britain. 
Tackling fuel poverty has required involvement from local authorities to start 
with. Some of the schemes have developed to the point where additional services 
have been integrated, making it more attractive for private sector entry. In 
Northern Ireland, the driving force behind the creation of a new ownership 
model for transmission assets came from the desire to protect all consumers 
from traditionally high energy prices. Consumer involvement was seen as the 
best way of achieving this. The regulatory framework in New Zealand also 
encourages direct consumer ownership by exempting wholly owned trusts from 
price-quality regulation.  
 
The high levels of consumer involvement as well as direct public involvement 
through local authorities in New Zealand are also a legacy of the transition to 
corporatisation. This is also true to a certain in extent in the case of Finland. The 
large share of nuclear in power system sustains new types of financing for new 
investment but is a legacy of past arrangements, particularly the establishment 
of TVO in the 1960s by Finnish industrial and power companies.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Public ownership remains potentially significant in and for the power sector. The 
above case studies provide a variety of examples of the nature of modern public 
ownership. They show that public involvement can co-exist with generally 
liberalised electricity markets, including at the retail market level. They also 
demonstrate that public ‘ownership’ can take a significant number of forms 
including: mutual ownership (e.g. Mutual Energy Holdings in Northern Ireland), 
consumer trusts (e.g. some EPBs in New Zealand), state ownership (e.g. ENAP in 
Chile, Fortum in Finland) and municipal ownership (e.g. some EPBs in New 
Zealand and some ESCOs in Great Britain). They further illustrate the 
mechanisms by which accountability operates via the selection processes for 
boards of directors. 
 
There are good reasons to think that the case for mixed public-private ownership 
models in energy is improving. However it is important to point out that the 
theoretical case for significant private ownership within most national energy 
systems remains strong. Many countries have in fact yet to introduce any 
significant private involvement in their electricity and gas sectors. Furthermore, 
while allowing multiple ownership forms to co-exist sounds attractive, it may 
impose significant whole system costs. For instance, the move towards 
privatising almost all publicly owned energy assets in the UK allowed the 
government to close the Department of Energy between 1992 and 2008 (when it 
reopened as a Department of Energy and Climate Change) largely because 
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energy policy for that period could be summarised in one phrase: ‘leave it to the 
market’.17 
 
Several key questions are suggested by the paper: 
 
The ability of public entities to reduce the amount of equity in their businesses 
and to borrow at very low interest rates remains a clear motivation for public 
ownership. This has always been a key driver (see Kwoka, 1996). This raises the 
issue of whether the benefits of public ownership are related to a genuine 
reduction in risk relative to private ownership (say due to reduced risk of 
appropriation).  They could simply be due to a potentially inefficient (and 
unclear) shifting of risks on to taxpayers, away from private investors who 
would be better able to manage them. Equally, the lower borrowing cost 
associated with special purpose vehicles for electricity transmission assets (e.g. 
in Northern Ireland) or low risk electricity distribution utilities (e.g. in New 
Zealand) may be more to do with the market’s preference for unbundling low 
risk assets from higher risk ones (in other jurisdictions or in other parts of the 
supply chain) rather than public ownership and governance arrangements per 
se. Simply put, are the nominal financing cost reductions observed under 
public ownership actually genuine improvements in social welfare 
requiring public ownership? 
 
Innovative forms of new public ownership exist in institutional environments 
which are open to institutional innovation and willing to experiment with 
ownership and governance arrangements. If competition in ownership forms 
and innovation in terms of ownership and governance structures is 
desirable, what prevents different ownership forms from emerging? 
 
New forms of public ownership have been sharpened by competition with the 
private sector. Indeed one could argue that the very success of privatisation 
forced a benchmarking of public enterprises against their private peers.  There 
does not appear to be any justification for a return to the large wholly 
government owned monopoly SOEs of the past. In all the jurisdictions 
represented by our case studies, private ownership exists and is clearly an 
institutional option for underperforming publicly owned firms. If public 
ownership is to be encouraged, this needs to be within a context where the 
benefits of competition from the private sector are maintained. Thus, how can 
we maintain benefits of both private and public involvement? 
 
Finally, it is important to stress that the current challenges facing the power 
sector are not uncontroversial, in the sense that they may be self-imposed, 
illusory and subject to other forms of mitigation rather than public ownership of 
energy assets. Thus the incompleteness of energy market reform is not 
necessarily desirable in many jurisdictions. Climate change policy could be 
significantly simplified and more effective if it involved the imposition of a high, 
stable and credible carbon price. Energy security concerns are best handled by 
                                                 
17 The costs of having different ownership forms do not have to be significant, if publicly owned 
firms are operated as if they were privately owned firms. However this would obviate the 
rationale for public ownership. 
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allowing private investors to assess risks in a world of increasingly globally 
integrated oil and gas markets. Consumer engagement can be organised via 
effective regulation or public advocacy. Finally, the impact of the financial crisis 
on investment in energy may be best mitigated by redoubling efforts to create 
well-functioning market and regulatory institutions.  Thus in the end, we 
should ask, to what extent is improving case for public involvement in 
energy driven by ill-defined policy objectives and incomplete markets? 
 
In closing, we acknowledge that our analysis poses more questions than it is 
capable of resolving. Revisiting our case studies in the near future would allow 
us to evaluate how successful they have been in achieving their objectives. 
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